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Abstract 
Nowadays, the Internet has had a rapid expansion and presence in all areas of the 
individuals, institutions, companies and organizations lives. This has made large extent 
of data available so that the users need to access their desired information or services 
through using search engines. To continue and promote providing services, search 
engines require a source of income. Sponsored search advertising is the main source of 
revenue for search engines. In sponsored search, limited areas of the search results page 
are dedicated to display advertising so that the advertiser pays the advertisement cost 
only per click. To assign advertising areas, an auction is run among advertisers. Several 
models have been proposed to hold a sponsored search auction. In this study, a new 
model is proposed to increase the revenue of the search engine. Evaluated using 
synthetic data, the results of the ad-supported implementation of the search engine model 
indicate improved revenue in comparison to existing models. 
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  Introduction 
Every day, millions of web pages full of information are being explored by millions of 
Internet users worldwide. Due to the large volume of information and news about goods, 
music, or anything else which can be easily found online, living in the virtual world would 
be difficult or impossible without search engines. The increasing use of search engines is 
not limited to keyword search for finding the products and information; they are also a good 
place for advertising. More than 50 percent of internet users use search engines at least 
once a day, so that it reaches over 6 billion searches per month only in America. Above 13 
percent of the traffic from search engines comes from commercial sites (Szetela & 
Kerschbaum, 2010). Search engines create effective opportunities for marketers to attract 
millions of users towards the manufacturers and service providers’ web sites. Search 
engines display ads in certain regions of the page which are more likely to attract users’ 
attention. Sponsored search auction mechanism is used for determining the price of these 
limited areas and allocating them to advertisers (Jansen & Mullen, 2008) 
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This paper proposes a new model for determining the winner of the auction and the 
arbitration price in sponsored search engine. The results show that the model improves the 
search engine revenue compared to the existing models. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II introduces sponsored search 
engine by considering the roles of user, advertiser, and search engine. It also reviews 
different auction mechanisms in determining the winners and the price to pay. In Section 
III, the proposed model is presented and sponsored search advertising system is designed 
and implemented. Section IV presents the simulation results. To assess its effectiveness, 
revenue of the proposed model is compared with that of other existing models using 
randomized data. The advertising system is also implemented and evaluated. Finally, 
Section V concludes and presents the future trends. 
 
Sponsored Search 
 “Sponsored search” relates the process of advertising in Search engines. In this method 
of advertising, advertisers pay only when their ads are clicked. The cost is determined using 
sponsored search’s auctions. The behaviour of the Internet users, advertisers and sponsored 
search engine are dependent and has an important role in the sponsored search process. This 
section explains the search process, the participants’ behaviour, and the auctions. 
A. The concept of sponsored search 
Selling the advertising in traditional media (e.g., magazines and television) is generally 
based on the number of ads or people exposed to the ads. However, the sponsored search 
cost is calculated based on the number of clicks. The advertisers pay only when a user 
clicks on their ad. The cost of a large fraction of traditional advertising and even large 
amount of brand advertising typically is determined through informal assessment and 
negotiation processes. Nonetheless, sponsored search advertising provides efficient pricing 
through online auctions to attract advertisers’ genuine desire and to support them over the 
time. In the industry of sponsored search, different auctions are held for different phrases 
that are being searched. For example, the queries “Plasma TV” and “three-dimensional 
television” will be considered in two separate auctions. 
Advertiser proposes a list of keywords and suggested prices to the search engine. 
Suggested price means the highest price the advertiser can pay per click (Szetela & 
Kerschbaum, 2010). Once a user looks for a keyword, an auction is run among the 
advertisers’ bids whose corresponding keywords are related to the search. When the user 
clicks one of the links, the corresponding advertiser will pay to search engine a price per 
click.  
Sponsored search auctions differ from traditional auctions. In the former, only buyers 
and one auctioneer, which is the seller itself, are playing the roles. However, in sponsored 
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search auction there are three players: 
- Advertisers, who suggest a price per keyword, 
- Search engine, who organizes the auction, and 
- Users, who search keywords; their behaviors determine the value of each 
advertising region.  
Moreover, the auction is not run only once; it is repeated and the advertisers can change 
their bids over the time. For example, if the advertiser is a travel agency, it likely will desire 
to increase its bid when it is close to holidays. Also, it can limit their bids to specific world 
area as it may be able to present services and products only to that area.  
The results provided by a search engine’s search algorithms are called “algorithmic 
results”. Usually, sponsored search ads are displayed above and on both sides of the 
algorithmic results. In general, these advertising results explicitly are shown as sponsored 
links according to recommendation of Federal Trade Commission (FTC) (Jansen & Mullen, 
2008). Figure 1 shows the search engine result pages that include algorithmic results and 
sponsored search advertising. 
 
(a) 
 
(b) 
Figure 1. Sponsored search advertising (a) Google, (b) Yahoo.  
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B. Participants in sponsored search auction 
Players in sponsored search engine auctions are Internet users, advertisers and search 
engines. Behaviour of each of these three participants can affect the behaviour of other 
players. In the following sections the behaviour of each of these roles is investigated. 
1) Internet users: Internet users play a very important role in the sponsored search 
auctions. In the advertisers’ point of view, Internet users generate traffic online on their 
website. The online traffic can lead to a purchase. From the search engine point of view, 
internet user’s clicks are equal to receiving advertising fees from the advertisers. Studies 
conducted on the behaviour of Internet users promote a better understanding of the 
strategies adopted by advertisers and search engine. Internet user performs a search process 
which consists of the following decisions: First the user decides the keywords and search 
engine to use to search. After viewing the results, the user must then decide to visit a 
number of links. After exploring the links, the user should decide for a purchase ( http:// 
yahoo.com). These decisions are discussed as follows: 
1-1) Selecting search engine and keywords: Similar to in ordinary shopping trip, 
Internet users must decide about the store to buy the items from. Here, a few questions are 
raised: Which search engine is better to use? Which search engine will attract more users 
and why? Does a user prefer to use several search engines? Which keywords are most often 
used? 
Answers of these questions are of great importance in the policies of search engine 
campaigns and advertisers (Yao & Mela, 2008). These effects are discussed in subsequent 
sections. However, it may be said briefly that if the Internet users tend to use different 
search engines and different keywords to search for a product, the advertisers then prefer to 
participate in auctions held by different search engines and different keywords. 
Furthermore, the probability of using a particular keyword has an important role in 
determining the degree of competition by advertisers on this keyword. For example, if the 
users who want to buy digital camera are often use words “digital camera”, digital camera 
advertisers also will prefer to use this word in their advertising and then the competition is 
increased among them. The competition directly affects the search engine income. 
1-2) Number of selected web sites to explore: The number of search links that a user 
clicks on influences the costs that advertisers will pay, the online traffic to the website, the 
shopping rate, and the search engine revenue. For example, if the user clicks more than one 
link, despite increasing the click rate of the advertisement it may result in dropping the 
advertiser’s sales due to very high number of alternatives available for the user. From the 
search engine’s view, the more number of clicks does not necessarily lead to greater 
income. It should be noted that the search engine’s income (Equation 1) is derived from the 
number of clicks (n) and cost-per-click (CPC) (Athey & Nekipelov, 2010). 
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nCPCrevenue *      (1) 
So even by increasing the number of clicks, it is possible to reduce the cost per click. 
Advertisers will decrease their offers due to declining the sales. Therefore, the number of 
links affects advertising strategies, optimal auction design, and even the design of search 
results page (Yao & Mela, 2008). 
1-3) Selection of links to click: Due to the number of links that are displayed on the 
search results page, user can click the link(s). The page region that is more likely to be 
clicked is more valuable for both advertisers and search engine. That is, the ranking 
strategies and the auction revenue depend on the users’ choice. 
2) Advertisers: The advertiser needs to choose the keywords asking the search engine 
to advertise on them. To do this, the advertiser must measure the value of each region for 
each keyword in any search engine. After the decision, she must make a decision about the 
corresponding bid. She should also pay attention to the advertising design. These issues are 
referred to in the following parts. 
2-1) Selecting search engine and keywords: There are various search engines, each one 
puts up several keywords for auction. Therefore, an advertiser has to select the search 
engine and the keywords prior to entering the auction. For a selection, the following factors 
should be considered: 
1- The number of Internet users using a search engine and a specific keyword: The 
volume of users of a search engine for a specific keyword is used to estimate the number of 
clicks an advertiser sets. So advertisers should choose high traffic search engine and 
keywords. 
2- Characteristics of the Internet users: The level of the user’s impression of the 
advertisement and her desire to click and purchase affects the online traffic of the advertiser 
website and shopping rates. Users with very specific goals will be more likely to click and 
buy. For example, users who search in a more specific keyword such as “hotels in Isfahan” 
may be more likely to book a hotel with respect to those who just search “Isfahan”. 
3- Mechanism Adopted by Search Engines and Competitiveness of the auction: This 
factor determines the probability of winning and payment value. Low winning probability 
and high payment price, scare the bidders and cause they avoid participating in the auction 
(Yao & Mela, 2008). 
2-2) Measuring the value of an advertising region: To find the value of a place to 
advertise, there are at least two candidate parameters that can have an influence on 
advertiser’s sales: 
1- Online traffic directed to the advertisers website, and 
2- Number of pages displayed in search results. 
The value of these two variables cannot be calculated easily because they have an 
A Profitable Sponsored Search Mechanism 
IJISM, Special Issue (ECDC 2014)                                                                                      24-25 April 2014 
46 
indirect influence on the advertising process and purchases. After one click, the user may 
remain loyal to a store due to a positive feedback even when the click has not resulted in a 
purchase. He may return in the future for other purchases. With this assumption, the place 
will be underestimated. Since many online retailers offer a variety of products, calculating 
the resulting revenue even when a click leads to a purchase is difficult due to difficulty of 
predicting the product the customer may purchase. In addition to the number of clicks, 
sponsored search advertising can do feedbacks like banner advertising. This feedback will 
raise awareness among consumers. Many advertisers bids wrong keywords to also advertise 
in the result pages that are potentially unrelated. For example, the eBay.com chooses 
grammatically incorrect keywords such as “ebbay”, “ebya”, and “eaby” at Google.com 
(Yao & Mela, 2008). 
2-3) Designing advertisement: Designing an ad on the search results page affects click 
on and feedback. Does the advertiser need to either publish further information on the 
search results page or keep that information hoping the consumers will be aware of this 
information in visiting his site? Although the first strategy may bring a better feedback, the 
second strategy increases the number of clicks. 
2-4) Pricing value: The pricing is related to the auction mechanism that the search 
engine employs. If the search engine uses general first-price or second-price auction 
mechanism, the advertiser’s winning only depends on the value of the bid. He will pay the 
price he offered for the region. However, if the search engine employs mechanisms that 
consider the quality of advertising and click through rate, then advertisers whose 
advertisements have high quality tend to offer lower prices. In contrast, advertisers who 
have low quality advertisements would tend to suggest a higher price to compensate the 
quality hoping to win a better advertising region which results in gaining more publicity 
and quality that in turn can cover decreasing their bids. 
3) Search engine: In search engines several complex issues exist which are explained 
as follows. 
3-1) Optimal auction design: Revenue maximization is the problem that is considered 
in designing an auction mechanism for a search engine. This issue is related to several 
factors which are considered in the following parts. 
1- Winner Determination and Payment: The major problem in designing an auction 
mechanism is determining the winner and the price to be paid by the winner. There are 
different mechanisms such as first-price and second-price auctions. However, they cannot 
be applied directly as sponsored search auction. Revenues expected from advertising 
winner depends on the number of expected clicks (α) and the price paid per click (CPC) 
(Yao & Mela, 2008). 
The other parameters have an impact on these two factors and should be considered in 
the design of the mechanism: 
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- Which areas the advertiser should win? 
 Better area results in more clicks and then has a higher price. Click through rate of 
each area is not independent of the identity of the winner. Click through rate varies for 
different advertisers who advertise on this site. 
- Advertisers Neighborhood.  
For example, if ad of a small retailer will be placed next to a large retailer 
advertisement, users are absorbed to large retailer and so click on the small retailer is 
decreased.  
- How many auctions should be held and how many regions should be considered for 
each auction? 
Offering more keywords can increase the number of bids. This may get the advertisers 
to focus on multiple auctions which in turn reduce competition in each auction. Multiple 
auctions may change the advertiser valuation of each situation causing change of his 
behaviour in the auction.  
2- Reservation price: Search engines can determine the minimum possible bid so that 
any offer lower than the amount will not be accepted. The auction considers this minimum 
price as “reservation price”. Search engines can take advantage of reservation price as a 
means to maximize revenue. The basic idea is that all costs in excess of the reservation 
price is received from the winner. Although this concept can be used in optimization of 
reservation price in sponsored search engine auctions, a high reservation price decreases the 
chance of lower bidders for participating the auction. The reduction in the number of 
bidders could reduce competition and result in lower search engine revenue (Yao & Mela, 
2008). 
3-2) Results of search queries: Search engines are competing to absorb users and 
advertisers. It is the nature of competition between search engines that advertisers and 
customers choose the search engine. Due to this, each search engine independently adopts 
policies to maximize the profit. Such policies include strategies for customers (such as Web 
page design and search algorithms) and the advertisers’ strategies (such as auction 
mechanism).  Auction mechanisms will be reviewed in part C in Section II. The product of 
a search engine for users is search results. This free information includes the main results 
and also sponsored advertisements. Search engine sells users clicks and observations to 
advertisers in auctions. Advertiser wishes to publish the ad in a more general and popular 
search engine to propose a higher bid. Hence, the competition for Internet users is 
investigated. Covering all topics related to a specific keyword on the internet is impossible 
for a search engine. Search engines should decide about covering the most comprehensive 
online information or a distinction between the coverage of different search results. More 
acute in the case of the first strategy, all search engines should present the same results and 
rankings to different users of the same items. As it is expensive to visit multiple search 
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engines, users reasonably are not expected to visit different search engines providing the 
same information. This situation leads to (1) Search engines compete massively to attract 
Internet users, (2) fewer advertisers in each search engine and less money they will pay for 
each advertising region. In contrast, when search engines present different information, 
they attract different classes of web users. From an advertiser's perspective, this 
classification makes sponsored search more valuable. She can customize the ads adapting 
different parts, so there is much difference in price, which in turn leads to increased revenue 
from the auction. 
3-3) Targeted marketing - product differentiation among users: Targeting customers in 
a virtual environment can be very profitable so that email customization based on 
customers’ characteristics increases the amount of clicks about 62 percent (Yao & Mela, 
2011). The same concept can be taken into consideration in sponsored search auctions. 
According to past views and clicks, search engine can provide the users with more relevant 
ads. Such customization of ads with respect to the topic of the user’s query, increases return 
on investment (RIO). From the advertisers’ point of view, the advertiser might focus on the 
best profitable customer segment. Especially when the advertisers’ products are different, 
different sectors will be profitable for them. In the perspective of the search engine, the 
customized ads help advertisers to increase the amount of their bids for the advertising 
regions and consequently heighten their profit (Yao & Mela, 2008). 
3-4) Click fraud: Click fraud is clicking on the advertisement without any need for the 
information and going shopping the product. The main objectives of click fraud are: (1) 
Generating false statistics about the number of advertising views and clicks and/or (2) 
Eroding funds of competitor companies. Estimations indicate that between 10 to 15 percent 
of clicks are fraudulent, that the annual cost will be $1 billion. While the advertisers pay the 
cost, it increases the search engines’ revenue. However, high levels of fraudulent clicks on 
their ads can shift the advertisers towards the other search engines which will cause a sharp 
decline in the search engine revenue. In order to support the advertisers, popular search 
engines, including Google, are doing a lot of efforts to combat fraudulent clicks. Search 
engines who fully reveal the details of fraudulent clicks will reduce the negative effect on 
the advertisers (Yao & Mela, 2008). 
B. Auction mechanisms 
How do search engines rank orders to place at search result page? Calculating costs 
based on the number of clicks rather than the number of observations has created unusual 
problems. Instead, the search engine can auction the observations; that is, each region of the 
result page in a separate auction. Anyway, the number of clicks is auctioned (Feng, 
Bhargava & Pennock, 2007). It is assumed that a particular region of a page is considered 
for displaying the sponsored results and the mechanism should select a listing and ranking 
method to show the results there. A very simple method is to display advertisements in 
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descending order of the advertisers’ bids. This approach is completely transparent to 
advertisers demonstrating the amount to offer for any given place. Another option is to 
consider the probability of click on any ad. Considering click through rate can boost 
income, although decreases the transparency of auction. Search engines also avoid 
accepting irrelevant and offensive advertising that reduces the level of quality and causes 
the loss of income. Hence, the question raised is whether automatically advertising filtering 
reliable or it has to be controlled manually? Recognizing and preventing clicks by robots or 
fraudulent clicks are a major management challenge affecting the trust in a search engine. 
In general, the search engine revenue depends on keeping advertisers and users and 
preventing their absorption to the other search engines. Therefore, in order to design a 
sponsored search engine mechanism, keeping users and advertisers as well as the revenue 
of search engine should be considered.  
There are different methods for determining the winner, the advertising place, and 
payment. In early versions, the sponsored search mechanisms held based on general first-
price auctions. Later, the second-price auction was used.  These two auctions are strictly 
based on bid prices. Next, other models proposed considering the number of possible clicks 
(e.g., V×α and α Ranking models). These models are described in the following parts. The 
following parameters are used in studying different models: 
B (Bid): Price offered by the advertiser 
P (Pay-per-Click): Price paid by the advertiser for each click 
α: An estimate of the expected number of clicks 
K: The number of advertising regions 
N: The number of advertisers; N> K 
1) Generalized Firs-Price Auction (GFP): In this model, advertisers are arranged 
descending on the basis of their bids. Advertiser, who has the highest bid, wins the best 
region and will pay as his bid. The advertiser, who had the second-highest bid, will win the 
second highest region and will pay as of his own bid, and so on as Equation (2) shows. 
Payments occur per click. Yahoo marketing found that GFP is not appropriate for this 
environment. 
ii BP            (2) 
For example, suppose a specific keyword is worth 10$ and 6$ per click for advertisers 
A and B, respectively. If B starts with the lowest possible bid (e.g., 1$), advertiser A should 
bid a little more than B’s (e.g., 1.1$) in order to get the first place. Then B offers 1.2$, and 
so it is continued until A reaches 6$.  Here, B will no longer bid, as it will go beyond its 
value and cause B’s loss. As a result, B bid 1$ for the second place. Then, it is enough hat 
A bids 1.1$ for the first place. This causes B to propose $1.2 and thus the cycle continues 
and will not conclude a stable situation. In 2002, Google introduced a method based on 
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generalized second-price auction. The method was also welcomed by Yahoo! Inc. 
2) Generalized Second-Price Auction1: In this approach, advertisers are sorted in 
descending order based on their bid prices. The advertiser offering the highest bid wins the 
best place and will pay the price proposed by the second highest person plus a very small 
amount (usually $0.01) per click. The second advertiser wins the second place and will pay 
as the third highest bid plus the small amount, and so on (Edelman, Ostrovsky, & Schwarz, 
2007) . The payment is according to Equation (3). 
01.01  ii BP          (3) 
The method is less exposed to strategic behaviour of advertisers and brings more 
income for the organizer. In first-price auctions, advertisers are not motivated to declare 
their true prices. In fact, they are willing to declare lower price to reduce their losses if they 
win the advertising region. In the second-price auction, advertisers have no fear of 
proposing their true prices, as they will pay less than their bid if to be a winner. Afterwards, 
Google decided to use “quality rate” for ranking. Quality rate is calculated using the 
advertiser’s bid, click through rate on ad, relativeness degree of keyword, and other factors. 
It is expected that it brings the search engine more incomes. Search engine income depends 
not only the cost-per-click, but also very dependent on the click through rate. This method 
is called V×α ranking model. 
 3) V×α Ranking Model: Expected revenue from assigning an advertising area relates 
the price paid per region and its click rate. The estimated number of clicks on a link 
depends on the subjective relevance, credibility of web site and its rank in sponsored search 
engines. Because users naturally like to click on ads with a better ranks. This is based on 
calculating iiB   and listing top K advertising according to the ranked results. To calculate 
the price that is paid by the winner, assume )(ir  is the company that won the area i. If
)1()(  irir BB , then the company )(ir  will pay )1( irB  amount. Otherwise, it will pay the 
amount which is more than the predicted payment of )1( ir  (see Equations (4) and (5) for 
more details). 
If )1()(  irir BB ,  )1(  iri Bp        (4) 
If )1()(  irir BB , 
)(
)1()1(
ir
irir
i
B
p

 
       (5) 
 4) α Ranking Model: In this model, advertisers firstly are arranged according to their 
bids and K top bids are selected. Next, these K advertisers are sorted based on the expected 
number of clicks and then the owner of highest expected number of clicks win the first 
region; the second takes a second place, and so the places are sold (Szetela & Kerschbaum, 
2010). Actual price the winners pay per click equals the (K+1)th bid in sorted list of bids, 
as shown in Equation (6). 
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1 ki BP           (6) 
 
The Proposed Model 
The goal of the sponsored search is increasing the revenue of search engine. The 
income is only achieved by clicking on sponsored ads. In determining the winning bid, the 
bid amount (B) alone is not sufficient. The estimated number of clicks on the link (α) is a 
very important factor in determining the winning bid. Because, an advertiser might bid 
high, but receive no or low clicks due to the low ad quality. As a result, search engine 
expected profit of this advertising will be low and not fulfilled. Similarly, considering the 
estimated number of clicks alone as a factor in determining the winner of the bid is not a 
good choice. Because the advertisers avoid proposing true bids for their high quality 
advertisements and bid lower prices which reduce search engine profit. In this section, we 
propose a model to rank advertisements and determine winning advertiser by using these 
two factors. To better understanding the performance of such an engine, Hami, a sponsored 
search advertising system and interfaces are designed and implemented on top of Hakim2 
(Hourani, 2011), an ontology-based experimental search engine. 
A. Revenue Augmenting Model 
Price determination is designed so that search engine can receive the maximum benefit 
without imposing advertisers any fear of offering their true bid. The winner and payment 
determination model are as follows. Ranking is similar to V×α ranking model; however the 
payment is different and increases the expected revenue of sponsored search engine. 
1) Winner determination: Advertisers are sorted based on iiB   to determine the winner 
(see part C.3 in Section II) and the advertising regions are allocated to advertisers; the first 
part is dedicated to the advertiser i with highest iiB  , and so on. 
2) Payment determination: Suppose )(ir  is the advertiser who won region i. As 
Equations (7) and (8), if )1()(  irir BB , advertiser )(ir  will pay )1( irB ; Otherwise, he will 
pay the amount of his bid.  
If )1()(  irir BB ,  )1(  iri Bp        (7) 
If )1()(  irir BB , )(iri Bp               (8) 
B. Design and implementation of the advertising system  
The advertising system is designed in three parts for displaying advertisements, 
advertiser, and search engine management as follows. 
- Display Advertising: This part that is included in search engine displays 
advertisements and operates in the case of clicking the advertising links. 
- Advertisers: This part is for registering advertisers to manage designing their 
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advertisements and bids. 
- Management: This module is for measuring the statistical performance of the system 
and removing inappropriate advertisements. 
1) User and advertiser activities: The activities of the advertiser and user in interaction 
with the system is described below. User inserts a keyword to search using search engine. 
Search engine provides organic results and updates its database to generate list of 
advertisements. After holding the auction, list of advertisements is provided and they are 
displayed along with organic search results. When user clicks on advertising link, 
advertisement page is displayed. Then the actual price of the ad is deducted from the total 
amount introduced by the advertiser and an email containing advertisement date and time in 
addition to remaining credit and the actual price is sent to the advertiser’ email.  
The advertiser registers a new Ad by inserting advertising information including its 
subject, content, link, bidding price, and a total amount of credit. If the Ad is acceptable 
(e.g., price is in numbers not alphabets, or bid is less than the total credit, etc.), the Ad 
information is stored in the database. Otherwise, an error message is displayed.  
Advertiser can edit or delete Ads. He can edit an Ad by editing the financial or other 
information related to the Ad. If the information is correct, the database is updated 
accordingly. In the case of deleting an Ad, its information will be deleted.       
2) Design of advertisement system: The Hami sponsored search advertising is 
implemented using 3-Layer Architecture (Nozari, 2008) and .NET programming. The 
model is developed into Hakim search engine. 
To overcome the complexity of software systems, particularly in engineering systems, 
the system is divided into several layers. Each layer receives services from the previous 
layer and provides the next layer with services. This architecture divides the system into the 
following three layers: 
1- The data layer: The data layer is responsible for storing, retrieving and updating 
data. The website uses stored procedures to reach a higher program efficiency and 
transparency. 
2- Business logic layer: This layer acts as an intermediate layer that receives 
information from the presentation layer and sends it to the data layer. Or it receives the 
query results from data layer and delivers them to the program. All organizational rules and 
conditions are controlled in this part of the system. Inside the logic layer, there is a data 
access layer which controls relation with data layer. 
3- Presentation layer: This layer is the user interface and forms which users deal with 
them. 
User queries are sent from presentation layer to business logic layer. The business logic 
layer controls information and if valid, sends the request to the data layer. Data layer also 
process data according to the user requests delivers the results to business logic layer. This 
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layer sends the outcome to presentation layer.  
This architecture has the following advantages (Nozari, 2008): 
1- Other layers and program structure are less vulnerable to any change in data layer. 
2- Segmentation of the application in several layers reduces the complexity and 
volume of programming. 
3- Change, development, maintenance and support of software can be readily available 
in the future. 
4- Each layer acts as independently. 
5- Classes in each layer are reusable in other projects. 
6- Decomposed into several subsystems, making developing a system more easily and 
quickly. 
7- Presentation layer is separated from database commands and queries. 
8- Maintains location transparency; no intervention and involvement of layers with 
each other. 
3) Implementation of advertisement system: The three-layered architecture of the 
advertisement system is implemented as follows:  
 Layer 1 - Database: SQL Server Express Edition is used for development of the 
system database. The database can be designed using two methods: 
1- Per each keyword one table can be considered containing advertisement information 
such as the advertiser, Ad content and bid price. 
2- Considering a public table that includes all advertises and bids.  
The advantage of the first approach is faster search and ranking. However, it doesn’t 
specify any particular keyword and advertisers can choose any arbitrary word. Therefore, 
tables will be generated dynamically and in unlimited number. This results in time 
complexity and the need for more memory for database. Therefore, we use the second 
method and stored procedures for reducing the search time. Three tables detail the database: 
- Auction table: It is the main table of the system database. This table stores ID, 
Advertiser’s name, Keyword, URL, HeadLine, AdText, Bid, Viewed, Clicked, Payment, 
and Cost of all the ads from all advertisers. 
- Advertiser table: Information about advertisers is stored in the table. 
- Log table: This table is used for saving the system log. The table shows the date of 
each click and the ad displayed per that click.  
Layer 2 - Business Logic: This layer is related to data and representation layers. It is 
divided into two parts. One part (associated with presentation layer) receives the user 
requests and delivers them to the second part, or vice versa. The second part is related to the 
data layer through which storage, retrieval, and editing operations are carried out. 
Layer 3 - The presentation layer: The system consists of three levels of access for the 
user, advertiser and managers of the system.  
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Discussion 
The goal of the proposed model is increasing the revenue of the search engine. The 
search engine revenue depends on the cost of advertising and click through rate. These two 
factors are dependent on the behaviour of advertiser.  That is, theoretical evaluation of the 
model requires using and accessing the management of a real search engine. Due to this 
limitation, the performance of the proposed model against other models is evaluated using 
synthetic data in auction settings under the same conditions. Sponsored search engine is 
simulated using four auction models for the 3 regions by participating 5 advertisers.  
Each advertisement has three factors: 
B Bid, 
P Payment, 
α Estimation of the expected number of clicks. 
It is assumed that each advertisement has been displayed for hundred times. Therefore, 
the auction revenue is calculated using bid price and estimated percentage of number of 
clicks multiplied by 100 as shown in Equation (9): 

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i ii
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 For comparing these models, we assume hundred keywords auctioned in the auctions 
and each one has been searched hundred times. Then, the total revenue of the search engine 
will be as Equation (10):  
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A. Simulation Experiments 
First, we assume that each advertiser has one ad so that each ad is displayed one 
hundred times. The comparison is repeated three times using random generated bids –
offered by five advertisers A, B, C, D, E— and possibility of click on each ad as shown in 
Table I. The winners and the payment prices are determined based on related equations in 
parts C.2 to C.4 in Sections II as well as the proposed Hami model (part A in Section III). 
The revenue of each auction is calculated using Equation (9). Table II depicts the winners 
of the auctions. The results show that the proposed model achieves better results than V × α 
Ranking and α Ranking auctions. It is observed that the winners’ ranking in the proposed 
Hami model is different from in Second-Price auctions. 
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Table 1 
Advertisers’ Bids 
      Experiment 
 
 
 Advertiser 
1 2 3 
Bid 
Click  
Possibility (%) 
Bid 
Click 
Possibility (%) 
Bid 
Click 
Possibility (%) 
A 81.47 9.75 41.15 58.35 22.42 23.64 
B 90.57 27.84 60.26 51.18 26.9 17.71 
C 12.69 54.68 75.05 8.25 67.3 82.96 
D 91.33 95.75 58.35 71.95 47.74 76.69 
E 63.23 96.48 55.17 99.6 62.37 93.44 
 
B. Overall Results 
To generalize, we suppose each participant advertises hundred ads where each will be 
displayed hundred times. Table III summarizes the revenues of auctions in three runs. It 
shows that superiority of Hami’s revenue against V × α ranking, α ranking, and general 
second-price auction models is 12, 38, and 3 percent in average, respectively.  
 
Table 2 
The Winners and Auction Revenue 
E
x
p
er
im
en
t Auction 
Model 
 
Region 
(1) Hami (2) V × α Ranking (3) α ranking (4) Second-Price 
Winner&Price Winner&Price Winner&Price Winner&Price 
1 
1 D 63.23 D 63.23 D 63.23 D 91.57 
2 E 63.23 E 26.12 B 63.23 B 82.47 
3 B 63.23 B 81.53 A 63.23 A 64.23 
Auction 
Revenue 
14400 10800 8430 11600 
2 
1 E 55.2 E 42.2 D 55.17 C 61.26 
2 D 58.4 D 42.9 B 55.17 B 59.35 
3 B 41.2 B 41.2 C 55.17 D 56.17 
Auction 
Revenue 
11800 9390 7250 7590 
3 
1 E 62.4 E 59.8 E 26.90 C 63.37 
2 C 47.7 C 47.7 C 26.90 E 48.74 
3 D 22.4 D 22.4 D 26.90 D 27.9 
Auction 
Revenue 
11500 11300 6800 12000 
Average 12566.67 10496.67 7493.333 10396.67 
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Table 3 
The Revenue Achieved from Hundred Runs of Auction Models  
Auction 
Model 
 
Experiment 
(1) Hami  (2) V × α Ranking (3) α ranking (4) Second-Price 
1 84400 74000 54000 79100 
2 82400 73200 48100 80700 
3 86200 76500 55400 83200 
Average 84333 74566 52500 82000 
 
  Conclusions and Future works 
 Search engine compasses the users and is of utmost importance in the Internet. 
Nowadays a search engine is not limited to searching the web; it has become a useful 
technology for advertising and E-commerce. By using a sponsored search process, search 
engine displays ads which are chosen through holding auctions. This study first 
investigated the role of the Internet users, advertisers and search engine and their 
interactions in a search process. Different methods such as first-price auction, second-price 
auction, α ranking model, and α × v ranking model are used by sponsored search for 
ranking ad bid prices. The study is then proposed a new model to hold the auction. 
Comparison of the results gained by the proposed model shows that it always dominates α 
ranking model, is always better than or equal to α × v ranking model, and is generally better 
than second-price auction. Therefore, the proposed model theoretically increases the 
revenue of search engines. The model was added and implemented as a “Hami” advertising 
sponsored search system on top of “Hakim” search engine. 
The “Hami” advertising system is a prototype of a sponsored search advertising system. 
The search engine could be developed to display ads based on geographic areas and local 
time to assess the model based on experimental evaluation. For statistical analysis and 
inference, data mining can be applied on the information that is provided by the managing 
part of the model. 
 
Endnotes 
1. It should be noted that the Vickrey mechanism is the same method that was 
developed in 1963 by William Vickrey (Fasli, 2007). 
2. Hami and Hakim have Arabian roots and mean “support” and “wise”, respectively. It 
is worth to mention that the second author is from Syria 
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